"Longtermism" is a philosophical viewpoint developed by William MacAskill - the founder of the Effective Altruism movement (that which emphasises the allocation of resources to the world's largest, most tractable and most neglected problems). MacAskill holds that it is most likely that the number of 'future humans' who stand to inherit the Earth is far greater than the current population. Therefore, it must be a key moral priority of our time to act in the best interests of these 'future humans' - and thus morally urgent to consider the long-term impact of our actions on future generations. The issues prioritised by longtermists are typically those posing an existential risk (x-risk) to humanity - e.g. climate change, nuclear war and the governance of misaligned artificial intelligence. Biorisk is another key x-risk - for example, if 'Disease X' were to take the form of an engineered pathogen optimised for transmissibility and lethality, a 'Disease X' pandemic would be considered an x-risk and would, at the very least, devastate the social infrastructure upon which future generations might have relied. It would also eliminate the potential of life - i.e. if a person who might otherwise have had children is infected and subsequently passes, their death would be seen as ending a theoretically infinite lineage of descendants.
As discussed in the Introductory section, the democratisation of biotechnology has been cited as a key driver of the urgency of biorisk. As MacAskill notes in his seminal work What We Owe The Future, the relationship between the development of biotechnology and its market price far exceeds that stated by Moore's Law - whilst it cost over three billion dollars and took thirteen years to sequence the human genome just twenty one years ago, current estimates suggest that it now costs as little as six hundred dollars - a price which is progressively shrinking as time passes. As highlighted by The Guardian’s investigation in 2006, it costs less than forty pounds to obtain a fully sequenced fragment of the smallpox genome, the complete 'recipe' for which is readily available online. The rapid development of gene sequencing technologies paired with lax adherence to necessary biosecurity measures (i.e. screening processes) by the companies providing sequences of genetic material upon consumer request has led to the emergence of biorisk as a key existential threat. It is also worth noting that no national government has imposed a legal requirement for biotechnology companies to screen the sequences they produce - with approximately one in five orders produced by an organisation which has not pledged to voluntarily screen the DNA which has been synthesised.
This is not to say that the possibility of producing and disseminating an engineered bioweapon would be easily accessible to the average person - as biosecurity expert Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley notes, few individuals possess the specialist knowledge required to develop an effective bioweapon, and significant financial resources would be necessary to procure the biomaterials required to sequence an entire genome. If a malevolent actor were to successfully produce their desired pathogen, there would be further challenges associated with the propagation of the pathogen and, subsequently, the dissemination. The attempt by the Aum Shinrikyo death cult to spread anthrax throughout Tokyo was riddled with obstacles despite the technical expertise of its members - with the sprayer failing, pipes leaking and neighbours being alerted to the foul smell of the bacteria before the spraying actually occurred.
However, no matter how inaccessible the development process required to produce a bioweapon might be to the average individual, we cannot disregard the risk posed by malevolent actors and their intention to propagate destruction. Furthermore, whilst the concept of biorisk might evoke the image of a rogue scientist or of a foreign death cult, a far more tangible risk stems from the actions of governmental bodies - particularly those who have not committed to maintaining and upholding the global biosecurity framework established by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As explored throughout the previous weeks of content, the concept of dual use raises an ethical dilemma associated with all research studies involving enhanced pandemic potential pathogens (EPPPs) - or any other biomaterial considered to pose a significant hazard to the international community. Such research might prove beneficial - e.g. the gain-of-function research performed by Dr. Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka, whose manipulation of the H5N1 avian flu was considered significant in providing data about a likely Disease X candidate - but also presents the danger of creating a bioweapons 'recipe' which, if published in an accessible format without strict oversight, could be acted upon by just about anyone with the appropriate means and knowhow.
An antagonistic state might covertly pursue research into engineered EPPPs - ensuring that in the event of international warfare they are able to incapacitate their opponents in such a way that physically cannot be prevented. This might seem unlikely - the challenges of containing viral spread (particularly when a pathogen has been optimised for transmissibility) meaning that the state’s own population could be harmed (or even obliterated). That said, the local population could theoretically be vaccinated against the virus in advance, or receive supplies of antiviral treatment co-developed alongside the pathogen itself. The possibility of a bioweapons plot of this scale actually happening is incredibly small due to associated financial, ethical and logistical obstacles - as it would require a great deal of investment, the violation of several international bodies, a large number of willing and skilled researchers and a functional supply chain. Even if such an initiative were to be conceived, It is highly likely that it would be uncovered at some point during the planning and development processes - long before dissemination becomes possible. However, the mere possibility underscores the significance of biorisk as one of the most pressing x-risks of our time - particularly from a longtermist perspective.
“Nevertheless, nobody really knows what the Russians are working on today and what happened to the weapons they produced. Western security experts now fear that some stocks of biological weapons might not have been destroyed and have instead fallen into other hands.” (Alibek & Handelman, Miller et al.)
Mandatory Content 🦠
An Analysis of MacAskill’s Stance on Biorisk
The Most Dangerous Weapon Is Not Nuclear: A Kurgzgesagt Production
Engineered Viruses are the New Bioweapons: A Seeker Video
Rob Reid’s TED Talk: How Synthetic Biology Could Wipe Out Humanity